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Abstract 
An attempt has been made to assess the nature of peace, religion and society in Ethiopia, to examine the conflict 
emerging trends in the post 1991 Ethiopia and its implications for national integration and to identify the 
underlying causes, actors, and consequences of the conflict. Adopting ethnographic design, the study could secure 
substantial data through, key informant interview and focus group discussions with key stakeholders. Apart from 
this, the study was substantiated by critical document analysis. The study indicated that an official policy change 
has been observed in terms of interference, dichotomization and accusations for alleged radicalizing activities of 
Ethiopian Muslims. While this is considered as eroding the basic features and foundations of the constitution, it 
has its own implication on the ideology of secular state model .Although the policy of containing Islam has been 
started earlier, the regime has moved to replace, shape, and educate the ordinary Muslims along with the ideology 
of anew sect imported from Lebanon with the intention of curbing perceived extremism in Ethiopia. The study 
further revealed that the recent confrontation between the state and the Muslim community commenced since 2011 
has put a repercussion on three interrelated issues. The growing interference of the government in religious affairs,  
the violation of the ever secular constitution thereof and  the deterioration of the state and the Muslim community 
relations, which will have a great implication on the longstanding agenda of the state to create one political and 
economic community. 
Keywords: Islam, Ethiopian Muslims, Post 1991 era, Terrorism, EPRDF, state -society relations 
 
Introduction 
At various times in modern history, Ethiopia’s Muslims have faced systematic forms of discrimination, ranging 
from “benign neglect” to outright persecution and forced conversion to Orthodox Christianity. Muslims have been 
made to suffer from marginalization, discrimination, oppression, and underrepresentation, especially in the 
country’s economic and political institutions (Miftah, 2015; Ahmed, 1994). However, the country has a long 
history of religious tolerance and its constitution protects freedom of religion and provides for separation of 
religion and state. As such, there were no clearly reported religious domestic threats in the country. Islamist threats 
to Ethiopia’s security are primarily external, coming from Somalia and Sudan (AFPC, 2013). While almost all 
Muslims in Ethiopia are Sunni, with a plurality, if not a majority, adhering to one or another Sufi tarīqa 1 and that 
until the modern period, interactions between Christians and Muslims in Ethiopia have been relatively cordial. 
Unprecedented in the history of human race, the two major religious communities (Muslim & Christian) have been 
promoting peace among their followers in Ethiopia. However, relations between the state and the Muslim 
community are not being seen in a business as usual scenario in the contemporary Ethiopia. This relation 
increasingly appeared to be distorted following attempts state interventions into its religious affairs (BTI, 2016). 
The ruling party’s success in formerly disadvantaged regions of the country is partly attributable to greater 
religious tolerance and pluralism.  
 
Statement of the problem 
Though the relations between the Christian and Muslim communities in Ethiopia were expressed as cordial (AFPC, 
2013), the state policies and practices were directed against Muslims, in which the net result has been 
peripheralization (Miftah, 2015) of the country’s significant segment of Muslim population. The successive kings 
of Abyssinia commenced from the era of Tewodros II and their antagonistic policies towards Islam and Muslims 
led the marginalization of Muslims from the development arena in many respects. It has been most frequently 
discussed at various times in modern history, Ethiopia’s Muslims have faced systematic forms of discrimination, 
ranging from “benign neglect” to outright persecution and forced conversion to Orthodox Christianity (USIP, 2007; 
Zewude, 1990; Ahmed, 1993). Having the various repercussions of these policies  ranging from marginalization 
up to diminished self perception, strangeness and a feeling of alienation (Ahmed, 1993; Miftah, 2015; Zewude, 
1990) gone un noticed, the very recent actions of state and non state actors has led to the deterioration of state 
society relations(Fentaw, 2012) in the country. An official report by (USIP, 2007) stated that although many 
Ethiopian citizens strongly defend the historic peace between Muslim and Christian communities, they are 
uncomfortable with the visible growth of Muslim worship. Following the political transition in 1990s, the 
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Ethiopian Muslims started to breath an air of equality at least in textual sense (constitutional provisions 
guaranteeing equality) and practically to some extent. The ruling party’s success in this regard, particularly in 
formerly disadvantaged regions of the country is partly attributable to greater religious tolerance and pluralism 
(USIP, 2007). Another study by (Haustein and Østebø, 2011) witnessed that when the EPRDF ousted the Derg in 
1991, religious liberties were quickly introduced at an unprecedented scale. However, this situation could not stay 
for so long. Following the terror-attacks on 9/11 and increased geopolitical tensions in the region spurred increased 
concern from the ruling party, and Ethiopian Muslims were publicly accused of aspiring to political power based 
on radical religious ideas (Ibid). While there were no signs of significant threat from the domestic arena(AFPC, 
2013;Yimer, 2015), the EPRDF’s fear of  Islam was exacerbated by the increasing strength of Islamist insurgents 
in Somalia, and the political takeover by the United Islamic Courts  in June 2006 sparked concern over its potential 
effects on Ethiopia’s Muslim population (Haustein and Østebø, 2011 ). While no clear symptom of terrorist act, 
the government’s response came in the form of undertaking several measures which actually intended to protect 
an improbable takeover of governmental power by political Islam (Fentaw, 20120). The increasing interference of 
the ruling party through the council which finally ranged to inviting other sects called Ahbash from Lebanon, led 
to violent conflicts throughout every corner of the country in 2012 and the subsequent periods.  
 
2. Objectives of the study 
1. To assess the nature of peace, religion and society in Ethiopia 
2. To examine the post 1991 conflict emerging trends in Ethiopia and implications for national integration 
3. To identify the underlying causes, actors, and consequences of the conflict. 
 
3. Methodology 
The study is based on qualitative design based on ethnographic model. Several studies in the same and most of the 
related topics are undertaken in a qualitative design (Jon, 2014; Ahmed, 2006; Miftah 2014; Haustein and Østebø, 
2011), as they are not suitable for quantification. Based on the nature of the study, two particular primary data 
gathering tools, namely focus group discussions and Interview were used. Focus group discussions were held 
among the members of Ethiopian Islamic Affairs and some selected mosques in Dessie, Addis Ababa and Assasa, 
where violent conflicts have been occurred1. 
In-depth interviews with the Ministry of Federal and Pastoral Affairs and imams of six mosques from the 
aforementioned areas were employed for collecting substantive information on the nature of state society relations, 
Islam and Muslims across the different regimes in Ethiopia, post 1991 conflicts, actors and several other topics. 
However, many interviewees feared repercussions if their names were revealed, particularly the imams. For this 
reason, the names of all interviewees have been withheld. In some cases, the location of interviewees has also been 
withheld to avoid endangering them. In addition, it draws massive data from scholarly works, reports, policy 
documents and briefs, where findings, concerning actors, causes, consequences and policy implications were 
drawn.  
 
4. Conceptual Framework on State Society Relations, Socio-Political Cohesion and the nature of Peace 
building 
The concept of state-society relations and efforts to foster positive, mutually constructive relations has thus 
received greater attention. It could be expressed in terms of restoring or generating trust in government and public 
institutions and trust among citizens; and fostering notions of citizenship and socio-political cohesion (Haider, 
2011). This implies the fact that an instrument to foster a positive relationship between the people and the state is 
trust in government and its workings, which in turn develop a sense of citizenship or belongingness to the state 
and socio-political cohesion. In its literary meaning, the term citizenship (strong allegiance to the state) entails, 
how people perceive the state, and how the state perceives them, and this shapes what it means to be a citizen.  
In situations of fragility, political identity, fragmentation and weak state institutions reinforce each other. They 
undermine state legitimacy and the formation of genuine national integration; weaken interpersonal trust; and 
divide citizens. In situations of violent conflict, processes of ‘othering’ and dehumanization destroy social relations 
and networks and leave a legacy of deep mistrust and fear of others. Persistent divisions in the aftermath of conflict 
result in an unstable peace and the possibility of renewed violence (Haider, 2010).  
Weak social cohesion and distrust also impact negatively on perceptions of political community and on 
civic action. People are reluctant to engage with the ‘other’, hindering the development of civic engagement and 
collective action. In addition, fear and insecurity and feelings of powerlessness and marginalization from conflict 
can also weaken a sense of individual civic agency2. Where the state is involved in violence and repression, whether 
as a perpetrator, by active complicity or passive omission, such sentiments can be more pronounced. In addition 
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to withdrawing from citizenship, citizens may also respond to or cope with violence by establishing parallel 
governance or security structures. These can further weaken the legitimacy of state institutions and exacerbate 
intergroup divisions where such parallel structures cater solely to specific groups1. 
For the purpose of this article, it is crucial to see it in terms of how the Muslim community can recover 
from episodes of state violence. The nature of grievances and demands in a conflict is central to the analyses of 
Svensson (2007) and Fox (2003). Fox argues that ‘when religious issues are important, they will change the 
dynamics of the conflict’, (2003, 125). This can be attributed both to the role of religious institutions within the 
state and to the way in which religion influences international intervention in ethnic conflict. Internally, religious 
institutions tend to facilitate a reaction if the grievances have religious importance; however, if they have no 
religious importance the religious institutions often inhibit protest. As discussed in several parts of this article, the 
controversy since 2011 has a devastating effect on the lives of citizens. Several died, others imprisoned, and the 
rest got exiled. However, the violence didn’t end up here. Hatred, enemity, and generally ‘no war no peace’ 
relationship is prevailed between the Muslim society and the state (USCIRF, 2014). Svensson (2007) argues that 
across religions, where the grievances or demands are based on explicit religious claims, the negotiated settlement 
of conflict is less likely to succeed than if there are no religious claims. The post 2011 era, therefore, is 
characterized by mistrust, weak or forced belongingness, and consequently weak socio-political cohesion, and 
hostile relations between the society and the state, which finally leads to state fragility. Thus, mechanisms of 
recovery should be established in conflict stricken settings.  
Therefore, key principles for sustainable violence prevention and recovery are: inclusion, early results to 
help build citizen confidence; establishing the basic institutional functions that provide citizen security, justice; 
and embracing pragmatic, best-fit options to address immediate challenges (Ibid). Thus, specific mechanisms 
tailored towards the psycho-social recovery of war- torn Muslim society need to be in place. Compromise and 
conflict-resolution could be seen as an integral part of political life, which will also enhance general welfare2.  
 
5.1 State Society Relations in Ethiopia 
Islam had no room in the Ethiopian political tradition, and Muslims were considered as second class citizens until 
the downfall of the imperial regime in 1974. Though the entire history of Islam was under domination, the 
relationship was extremely cordial and the Christian Muslim intimacy was absolutely unique from any part of the 
world. However, this kind of harmonious relationship was not seen between the state and the Muslims. There was 
an asymmetric relationship between Christian highland kingdom and Muslims, in which the former controlled the 
main political institutions (Ostebo, 2008; Ahmed, 2006) and defined the latter as second-class citizens. Always a 
significant but institutionally disadvantaged minority (CGAF, 2016), the Muslim population has grown in relative 
terms in recent decades.  Although, EPRDF improved rights for Muslims initially, but it has intervened more 
deeply in Muslim affairs in recent years, imposing increasing restrictions on a community that has grown to rival 
the Orthodox Church in size. This has helped alienate some Muslims from the government (BTI, 2016). As cited 
in (Feyssa and Lawrence, 2014), Ostebo has convincingly shown in his in-depth analysis of the dynamics of 
religious identification in contemporary Ethiopia that although Islam does not have a political agenda in Ethiopia, 
the perception that it has informed government policy and needs to be corrected: “An increased number of mosques 
and higher representation of Muslims in public life can hardly qualify as evidence for a politicization of Islam in 
Ethiopia.  
In contemporary Ethiopia, constitutional violation in terms of religious interference is not an exception; 
despite the formal commitment in the constitution for, a government under the law and judicial independence, 
there are still widespread violations of laws by government officials and infringements on such constitutionally 
guaranteed rights as freedom of association, press, speech, and others. While these issues promised by the federal 
constitution, could be negotiated early, remain largely ignored. All these issues imply that the Ethiopian State has 
not substantially moved away from its traditions of using coercion and deceit in order to maintain control over its 
diverse population. Hence, State and society relationships in Ethiopia today are mainly characterized by the 
hegemonic control of the masses (or the majority) by the few who maintain control over the State and its economic 
and military assets.  
 
5.2 Religious Diversity in Ethiopia 
While there were no signs of religious diversity and equality in the entire history of the imperial Ethiopia, the Derg 
brought a radical change in the status quo that was likely to favor Islam (Ahmed, 2006) and enable it to attain a 
status of equality with Christianity, which had always been perceived as a state religion. This was a significant 
departure for Islam and Muslims in the history of the country. It was also during this time that the Ethiopian 
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Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs (ESCIA) popularly known as Mejlis, was formally established in 1976.The 
constitution of the next era, the 1995 FDRE constitution made a significant departure from its predecessors. 
Diversity of religion and ethnicity, among others were officially institutionalized and mechanisms were in place 
for extraordinary valuation.1 The constitution, in its article 11, fairly guaranteed the official separation of state and 
religion. It declares the ‘separation of religion and state’, assures there is ‘no state religion and above all, strongly 
demands that ‘the state shall not interfere in religious matters and religion shall not interfere in state affairs’. 
According to the U.S. government report, the total population of the country is estimated to be 93.9 million as of 
July 2013. The report further explains the religious demography of the country using 2007 census. Thus, it 
estimated that 44 percent of the population belongs to the Ethiopian Orthodox Church (EOC), 34 percent is Sunni 
Muslim, and 19 percent belongs to Christian evangelical and Pentecostal groups2. 
 
5.3 Contending Views on Islam and Terrorism 
Although a study by (Galtung 2014) noted that different religions have different degrees of potential to promote 
peace, it clearly acknowledges that there is no automatic connection between the belief system of a specific religion 
and the use of force by its followers. The prevalent discourse of the violent force of religion, however, is a myth 
that has been constructed by Western societies to legitimize their existence; and this myth is used to justify violence 
perpetrated by the West against Islamic societies (Canaugh 2009). Having the definition by themselves and 
exploiting such opportunities, popular commentaries facilely point to the ideological sources of conflict, 
maintaining that the Qur’an is inherently violent and that all forms of Islamism are nothing but an antecedent of 
violence, terrorism and totalitarianism particularly since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. In fact, most 
contemporary suicide attacks (1981-2008) can be attributed to jihadist groups’ (Moghadam 2009), the escalation 
of violence carried out in the name of Islam must be attributed to a combination of factors where contextual 
variables, individual psychologies and opportunity structures in a society are central (Hafez 2003; Jackson and 
Gunning 2011; Mandeville 2007; Wiktorowicz 2005a). Equally important notion here is radicalization, which 
many argues that it led to extremism and terrorism. Despite the existing rumors and emotionally loaded speeches 
of the western society leaders, there is no empirical evidence concerning what the path of radicalization is, whether 
religion, particularly Islam is responsible for it and the red line to demarcate radicalization from what is not. A 
study by (Aly and Striegher 2012), synthesized based on trial evidence of the first convicted Islamist terrorist in 
Australia come to the conclusion that ‘religion plays a far lesser role in radicalization toward violent extremism 
than the (counterterrorism) policy response contends’. However, the existing literatures urge us to see the dynamics 
against the backdrop of societal and global transformations and their repercussions on individual identities (Roy 
2004; Wiktorowicz 2005a; Coolsaet 2011; Schmid 2013). Therefore, the conclusion is, and of course the fact that 
radical jihadist groups resort to Islamic sources to justify their violent acts cannot, on its own, prove that Islam is 
inherently violent. 
 
5.4 The Culture of Peace and Co-Existence among the Ethiopian Society 
Despite the chauvinistic nature of the imperial statuesque, the social life of the people was always harmoniously 
interactive.  Following the demise of the imperial regime in 1974, the Ethiopian Muslims were granted 
landownership right in 1975 land proclamation. The subsequent regime, EPRDF, further improved the trend and 
acknowledged Muslims as legal cultural group. This could not stay long due to ridiculous reasons. The growing 
presence of Muslims in public offices and the mushrooming of mosques all over the country were repeatedly 
forwarded as evidence for the claim that Ethiopian Muslims were aspiring for political power based on radical 
religious ideas (Ostebo, 2013). 
The following discussion is quite telling concerning the peaceful coexistence and the culture of peace in a 
multicultural context. 
Now, I am 94 years old. I have passed in three reigns. I have gone several countries in Europe 
and the middle east and able to see the nature of relationship among the different cultural groups. 
Unlike these countries, where I made frequent tours, Ethiopia has a society with a formidably 
tolerant nature. Tolerance is nurtured in our society, and the society, which is highly diversified, 
could be considered as schools where the white people can take lessons. What should not left un 
noticed here is that, in every reign decrees were approved calling Ethiopian Muslims official 
conversion to Christianity. Christians were pressured to play their own role in the process. 
However, they hide Muslims in their home, while the securities search Muslims for jail. The 
Muslims, on the other hand, were loyal and humble for their Christian fellows. In the process, 
both Muslims and Christians lived together peacefully in the presence of an alarming pressure 
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from their successive rulers.  
 
5.5 The post 1991 conflict between Muslims and the ruling party 
More than any other system, EPRDF brought unprecedented changes for the Muslim population in Ethiopia. The 
regime, among other things, ended restrictions on hajj, suspended the ban on imports of religious literature, and 
lifted the restriction on the construction of mosques and religious schools, which in turn paved the way for marked 
enthusiasm and boosted religious activities among the Muslims (Ibid). This policy produced relatively positive 
relations between the regime and the larger parts of the Muslim population.  
However, the later developments could not be characterized as the beginning. Though humble in their 
nature, the pressures for the Ethiopian Muslims come from different directions. It is worthy of considering the idea 
that recently, Ethiopian Muslims have been suffering from increased pressure from the government, the EOC and 
the global community (Stockman ,2015). The government, for Ethiopian migrants killed in Libya by ISIS, has 
made a psychological pressure on Muslims in the country. Stockman further stated that the government and the 
EOC have been using the discourse of Islamic extremism more and more to justify their suspicion and crackdowns 
on the growing Islamic presence in Ethiopia. Ostebo, a well known researcher on Islamism and related issue in the 
horn of Africa, who himself has made countless trips to Ethiopia to do fieldwork in different regions of the country, 
witnessed that there are no signs of actual extremism or radicalization in the field (Østebø, 2013). 
A field interview discussion result revealed a fact not different from Ostebo’s finding. 
The controversy observed and its consequence between the Muslim society and the state is not 
due to terrorism. Because, if terrorism and its characteristics were seen in our society, we never 
tolerate it, as we are seeing what it mean in several occasions abroad. In our tangible situation, 
no bomb has been thrown or civilians were not targeted in any circumstance. Asking one’s own 
freedom is considered as an act of terror, who else is not a terrorist? If terrorists were there, 
how it could be possible to stay peacefully, at least in the presence of bitter grievance? The 
protests were absolutely peaceful, targeted only on the respection of the constitution. Although 
the government was highly unsuccessful in his frequent attempt to get a pretext using the state 
media, producing even documentary films, the people and international institutions are highly 
condemning as violation of human rights. Using the government’s strategy of dichotomization 
of Muslims, however, other actors are attacking Islam and Muslims in a number of ways.   
A recent finding by (Ostebo, 2013) has put the reality of dichotomizing Muslims as follows. 
“This effort to dichotomize and to promote “moderate” Islam has clearly been seen through the regime’s 
engagement in the Ethiopian Islamic Affairs Supreme Council (EIASC). This was clearly explained in the speeches 
of the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, as Nebaru Islmna, Salafism, Wuhabism,etc,..“ 
 
5.6 Why Increasing Intolerance for Islam and Muslims? 
One of the reasons of neglecting and resisting the revival of Islam is fairly discursive; labeling all aspects of Islamic 
revival in Ethiopia as if it were a manifestation of so-called global Islamic fundamentalism (Feyissa and Lawrence, 
2014). In this case there is some sort of misperception reflected among the people and even the policy discourses 
concerning fundamentalism. As Ahmed noted, “in the Ethiopian situation, fundamentalism is a misleading concept 
which distorts, and thus hardly applies to, the process of changes in the self-perception of, and assertion of rights 
by, Ethiopian Muslims. The second one is that the successive Ethiopian governments across political regimes have 
also tended to link Islamic revivalism in Ethiopia with external players, as if Muslims were a perennial source of 
national security threats (Ibid). This implies that there is an old image and ridiculous anxiety developed for 
centuries in the minds of the Abyssinian rulers and the entire public, though the nature of the relations between 
the Muslims and Christians in the country were harmonious, as described in several parts of this manuscript. By 
far, the most probable reason of the government for intolerance of Islam is tied with its geo-political strategic 
importance for US war on terror and an important ally for US project on counter terrorism which sensibly 
commenced since September 9/11 attack.  
 
6 Actors in the post 2010 conflicts 
6.1 Ministry of Federal and Pastoral Affairs 
A separate department established to oversee the inter-religious dialogue and pastoral affairs in the post 1991 era. 
From July to December 2011, the Ethiopian Ministry of Federal Affairs and the Ethiopian Islamic Affairs Supreme 
Council (EIASC) held mandatory “religious tolerance” trainings1 for all imams and Islamic school teachers and 
administrators in the Addis Ababa and the Amhara, Harar, and Omiriya regions (USCIRF 2013).  
The interviews made among training participant imams in Addis, report the situation as follows; 
I, as an imam in a mosque and other sheiks were invited to take part in the training 10 days 
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ahead of the training. We went as invited and attend it; An opening speech was made by a 
government authority concerning the perceived dangers of wuhhabism, Salafism and extremism. 
He also spoke about the importance of the training for combating the anxieties in inculcating 
the virtues of a new training. The invited guests (foreigners) started to deliver the lecture in 
Arabic language. However, there was a rumor among almost all of the trainees concerning the 
contents, as some of them were unique to our Islamic tradition and others highly contradictory 
to what we know. But they warned as to keep silent. We did accordingly. One of the trainers 
finally informed us that they came from Lebanon through the invitation by the Ethiopian 
government. They also advised us to adopt this sect across the mosques and Madras’s in 
Ethiopia.  
In the same vein, the USCIRF (United States Commission on International Religious Freedom) report, 
an institution always in charge of controlling religious situations through its chapter on Ethiopia, indicated that “in 
2011 the government made efforts to impose a particular Islamic interpretation on the country’s Muslim 
community”. It further stated that the Ethiopian government has overreacted, prosecuting and cracking down on 
peaceful Muslim demonstrators protesting against government interference in the internal religious affairs of their 
community(USCIRF, 2014). From this, it is clear to see that the trainings were led by al-Ahbash clerics from 
Lebanon and were organized by the government to promote the al-Ahbash Islamic ideology.  
Another interview made among two x-Imams in Dessie, revealed the same approach to the training, and contents 
of the training were fairly synonymous 
“An official from the Ministry of Federal and representatives made an introduction to the 
training concerning Wuhhabism extremism discourses and related issues. Then they left the 
stage for the trainers (people with Arabic nature). Arabic language was used as a medium of 
communication in the training. After estimated 30 minutes in the training, some of the trainees 
started to talk each other. However, since the representatives of the Mejlis informed at the 
beginning of the training not to ask questions of any kind over the contents of the teaching, 
nobody was able to ask any issue. We took the training and finished in two days. I asked one of 
the trainers in the tea break, however, concerning where they came and why. He informed me 
that they came from Lebanon with the invitation by the government of Ethiopia to teach their 
sect discourse to the Muslims in Ethiopia.” 
In his 2013 publication on Islam and state relation in Ethiopia, Ostebo also has clearly stated that the 
regime has quickly shifted its policy from containing Islam to producing its own “governmental Islam”. Similarly, 
USCIRF in its 2014 report has reported the situation at the aftermath of the training, Imams who refused to preach 
al-Ahbash ideology were dismissed from their positions and replaced with other imams, and some were jailed. 
The Aweliya Islamic School in Addis Ababa was closed in December 2011. Even in this time July 25/2016, about 
300 selected male university students from each university have been invited for a training to indoctrinate the 
“government’s own sect” ideology. The witness also informed the researcher that it will be followed by female 
students on the next phase1. These students, after the successful completion of the training will be sent to the 
universities and try to train others there too. The informant did not hide the similar trends in this regard conducted 
last year and the subsequent reaction of these students to other students over doctrinal issues in different 
universities. Thus, it is equally responsible for the escalation of conflicts and the later developments likely to occur 
as a result of this. 
 
6.2 Ethiopian Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs (ESCIA) Mejlis 
The ESCIA (Mejlis) since its establishment in 1976, through the voices from the Muslim intellectuals for quite a 
long period of time to institutionalize Islam, worked in the entire military regime only as a defacto, not de jure, 
organization(Ahmed, 2006; Feyissa and Lawrence, 2014). It failed to manage even key issues of Muslims in the 
post Derg era. Being an important apparatus of the government in deconstructing Islam and its legacy in the so 
called era of equality, even mosques are not established in some areas particularly Axum, the northern part of the 
country. In Axum, where the orthodox followers consider it as “sacred” area, even the constructed ones were 
forcefully destructed and zero response from the Mejlis. Corruption (financial, administrative and electoral), 
rivalry within the leadership of the Council (Ahmed, 2006), allegiance with the government till serving as an 
instrument, un democratic, un fair and un transparent electoral processes greatly undermined its credibility and 
claim to represent the Ethiopian Muslim community.  
The interview result held among one of the Imams in Arba Minch on the electoral process, its activities, 
independence and credibility with the Muslim community is stated as follows. 
The Muslim community at first demanded the election to be held at the Mosques, suspecting that 
it will not be genuine. However, the government refused to do so. But, no one was present at the 
                                                          
1. key informant interview  in Addis Ababa 25/07/2015 
Journal of Philosophy, Culture and Religion                                                                                                                                     www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2422-8443 An International Peer-reviewed Journal 
Vol.22, 2016 
 
35 
election districts. Immediately, the government further forced us to call the large Muslim 
community to go at each constituency and elect. If failed to do that, the government authorities 
warned us with emotionally charged words that we will face penalty. We worried a lot in the 
situation. 
Concerning this issue, the USCIRF in its chapter on Ethiopia, has indicated that while elections were held 
in September 2012, protestors denounced the elections’ credibility, complaining of government interference and 
that those individuals voted into leadership positions did not reflect the preferences of the community (USCIRF, 
2014). The report of the same institution in its chapter on the Horn of Africa, reported that in 2011-2012,  in 
response to concerns about rising extremism, the government of Ethiopia imposed the al-Ahbash interpretation of 
Islam on the country’s Muslim community, including through required training for imams; interfered in the 
independence of the community’s representative body, the Ethiopian Islamic Affairs Supreme Council (EIASC); 
and then arrested and prosecuted Muslims who opposed these actions and engaged in peaceful protests1. 
Since the government’s interference since 2011, many in the community no longer support and respect 
EIASC rather as government figureheads. Commencing from the 2011 controversy, the EIASC increased its 
regulation of the Muslim community. It issued two directives giving it greater oversight, and even ownership, of 
Ethiopia’s mosques. The directives include detailed rules regulating the administration of mosques; give the 
EIASC authority to issue internal mosque regulations and appoint mosque employees 2 ; and prohibit public 
meetings, speeches and preaching, and fundraising events without the EIASC’s written approval 3(Ibid). Ostebo, 
while explaining the extremely unsacred matrimony of the council, indicated that “while similar links between 
Islamic councils and political regimes have been observed in other parts of East Africa, the Ethiopian case reveals 
more explicit involvement by the authorities, something which became evident after 1995. In the election of a new 
council in January 2004, for example, the voting session was attended by a representative from the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (Østebø 2012).” 
 
6.3 Prominent Leaders (Established Committees) of the Muslim Community 
These committees were selected by the protestors over the interference of the government in the 2011/12 incidence. 
They were proposed to solve the controversy in a peaceful manner with the government. They were known for 
their religious services in the community and with a personality of high caliber. However, On July 6 and August 
3, 2015 respectively, the Ethiopian government convicted and sentenced 18 leaders of the 2012 Muslim protest 
movement. The worst act was the conviction of the committees “plotting to institute an Islamic government” and 
sentenced to seven to 22 years in prison under Ethiopia’s controversial Anti-Terror Proclamation. This act of the 
government and its use of the Anti-Terror Proclamation to silence critics have been criticized by the U.S officials 
and human rights.4  
The post 1991 EPRDF project war on terror, commenced with dichotomizing the peace loving Muslim 
society, has resulted in a number of far reaching consequences on security and human right. Despite the criticism 
by some intellectuals, frequent attempts of the government to abolish images of the Muslim society result in a 
growing suspicion within Ethiopian society.  Ethiopian Muslims are increasingly scrutinized. The worst action, as 
many condemned, is the documentary film called Jihaday Harakat, prepared and presented by the state media. 
This film is a calculated move of the regime, targeted to distract the cherished values of the Ethiopian society and 
ultimately portraying Muslims as a huge threat to other fellow religions and the Ethiopian state in general. Several 
studies like (Stockman 2015; Ostebo, 2013; USCIRF, 2014) have indicated that the film is really disastrous for the 
Muslims and for their Christian fellows, and on their citizenship of “othering” Muslims. Stockman, for instance, 
stated that “the film is especially worrying for Ethiopian Muslims because their peaceful movement is portrayed 
as extremist and radical. Although the goal of Harekat was to generate moral panic -which serves as the fabric of 
social control-, to portray the EPRDF as protector and to create division within the Muslim community, it actually 
resulted in a lot of criticism from all parts of Ethiopia.” 
 
7. The Questions over government intervention in religious and Secularism 
The 1995 constitution has already proclaimed that state and religion are clearly separated and no intervention of 
any kind should be made between religious institutions and the state. However, various stakeholders are verified 
that there were contemporary interventions of the state in to the affairs of the Muslim community. Several studies  
like (CGAF, 2016), and others for instance argues that Ethiopia is faced with difficult policy choices involved in 
guarding against internal radicalization through systematic (at times constitutionally questionable) interventions 
                                                          
1. USCIRF Chapter on the Horn of Africa 
2.Many in the Muslim community consider these employees as Al-Ahbash interpretation preachers 
3. No any alim (intellectual) can preach either individually or in group, without the permission of the EIASC permission paper 
or that of the committees in almost all mosques in the country. 
4.USCIRF Chapter on the HoA. 
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that have tended to favor established religious authorities. It further warns the consequences the risk of such 
interventions to the state’s neutrality as mediator. The alleged government intervention has been a debate among 
the various bodies over its certainty. Though the project has been formerly designed, it became vividly observable 
to the various researchers and institutions only in 2012/13. Østebø, in his latest publication on Islam and State 
relations in Ethiopia, investigated that “the current Ethiopian regime has moved from a policy of containing Islam 
to promoting its own form of “governmental Islam””dictating that the government has clearly intervened in the 
issue under discussion. He further states that Crucial in this regard is the cooperation between the regime and the 
Lebanese organization al-Ahbash and the ways the current regime in cooperation with this organization has 
embarked on a strategy of combating what it sees as “extremist Islam.”Various interviewed imams witnessed that 
they were forced to attend the conference by government bodies. At first, the government in the various meetings 
and through its media insisted that the issue of intervention is un true and even no any sect has been invited. Late 
on, the government the invitation of the Ahbash sect from abroad, but claim that it is not the government that made 
the invitation, rather tried to relate it with the Mejils. The point worth of consideration here is that the government 
accused, killed and sentenced quite a large number of the Muslim community who react such intervention up to 
22years of imprisonment. The project of inculcating the new sect through the Mejlis since its inception in 2012/13, 
has been taking place in every part of the country in firing the former imams and replacing by the 
new ”governmental” ones. The peace loving Ethiopian Muslims, at first, have tried to select some prominent 
leaders, ulemas among the community for dealing the issue with the government body peacefully. The response 
of the government came, however, in terms of accusing in the name of terrorism and radicalizing the community. 
The intervention and the subsequent controversy is increasingly instigating a conflict between the Muslim 
community and the state, which in effect is bringing about further consequences on the lives of individuals, family, 
and the country at large in terms of curving efforts towards national integration. 
Concerning the peaceful demonstrations and the government’s response to these demonstrations, the 
participant observation result is compiled as follows. 
In response to the required trainings and the closing of the Aweliya Islamic School, Muslims in 
Addis Ababa and several other Ethiopian cities held peaceful protests in mosques after Friday 
prayers since 2011.  As the mottos of the demonstrators reflected, they are calling on the 
government to respect constitutional protections for separation of religion and state and end its 
interference in their community’s internal religious affairs. The responses were not good in 
many respects. Generally, Protestors were beaten, arrested and harassed with some witnesses 
on police use of teargas and live ammunition against protestors. 
 
8 Current Trends in Relation to Islam and Security 
The ruling party’s increasing reactions and restrictions deprived Muslims of much of the freedoms they had 
acquired since 1991(Haustein and Østebø, 2011), and with the closure of Islamic organizations, it left the EIASC 
to emerge as the sole actor claiming to represent the Muslim population as a whole. Assisted by the ministry of 
federal and pastoral affairs (MFPA), the emerging nature of the council’s as a vast apparatus and its close links 
with the government have effectively enabled the latter to monitor and control the various longstanding complains 
within the Muslim community. Moreover, despite the increased voices and criticisms from the various human right 
organizations, political parties, intellectuals and others over its ambiguous nature, the country’s recently drafted 
anti terrorism law1, is being practiced to combat extremism and the subsequent terrorism. Due to the geographical 
proximity of the country to Somalia, where the theatre of Al-shabab and other groups is displayed, there might be 
an increasing tension and anxiety over terrorist attacks. However, there is no plausible justification that Islam and 
Muslims in Ethiopia pose security threats to the country (Fentaw, 2012). Terrorist attacks, as we are seeing 
everywhere in the world today, are justified by frequent ruthless attacks on civilians, which implies the blind nature 
of terror of any kind. The Ethiopian experience, a country with a huge number of Muslim populations comparable 
to that of Sudan, shows no registered terrorist attack in its long history. This shows that there is no security threat 
in the name of Islam in Ethiopia. In fact, terrorism come in to the scene in the contemporary era at the global level, 
owing the rest of the long human history dominated by worst records due to slave trade, colonialism, genocide, 
and more recently world war I and II. However, the effects of globalization, best characterized in swallowing the 
identities, cultures and civilizations of others, preferably minorities and propagation of the cultural values of the 
dominant groups, resulted in the consolidation of terror and terrorist groups in our world. From its very nature, 
Islam, is peaceful, and extremely encourages rational thinking and harmony among all human races. While 
terrorism put its apogee only at these days, the entire history of Islam, since its inception, is fairly characterized 
by the advancement of civilizations in science and arts. Once up on a time, preferably from the 4 th-12th century, 
while Europe was suffering from the effects of the period known as Dark Age, the light of Islam was bright in 
                                                          
1. “Whosoever writes, edits, prints, publishes, publicizes, disseminates, shows, makes to be heard any promotional statements 
encouraging... terrorist acts is punishable with rigorous imprisonment from 10 to 20 years.” 
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Arabian Peninsula. Thus, it is clear these days that leaders of the west tied Islam with terrorism. But, it is clear that 
they are the ones who instigated terror through their frequent and excessive interventions in the domestic issues of 
sovereign Arab states (Yimer, 2015). These includes the assassination of Saddam Hussein of Iraq and the 
subsequent emergence of factions thereof, un constitutional removal of leaders through financing oppositionary 
groups in Libya, Egypt, Syria, the cession of south Sudan and the repercussions thereof,  and very recently un 
successful coup attempt in Turkey. All these issues led to the proliferation of several factions and refugee crisis, 
which in effect brought about insecurity in many respects. Therefore, while there is no domestic security threat in 
the country, the policy diversions of the nation might be tied to the fact that it has been preferably considered as 
an important regional security partner to US1. 
 
9. The way forward 
It is widely discussed that not only the nature of Islam and Muslims in Ethiopia is absolutely peaceful but also 
interreligious relationships could be characterized as highly harmonious in the long history of the country. Muslims 
in contemporary Ethiopia still face difficult constraints. Large and frequent Muslim protests were usually peaceful 
and generally met with a restrained response by security forces, although there were instances of violence. Despite 
the frequent and excessive violations and marginalization they suffered from the successive Abyssinian rulers, 
Islam and Muslims existed and continue to coexist peacefully. The current action of the Ethiopian government 
against the Muslim community is a kind of conflict instigation and aggression which possibly could lead to total 
national and regional destabilization. Since 2011, the Ethiopian government moved against the country’s Muslim 
society unprecedented in its nearly 30 year’s history. The recent confrontation between the state and the Muslim 
community commenced since 2011 has put a repercussion on three interrelated issues. The growing interference 
of the government in religious affairs,  the violation of the ever secular constitution thereof and  the deterioration 
of the state and the Muslim community relations, which will have a great implication on the longstanding agenda 
of the state to create one political and economic community. Various scholars are forwarding their views on the 
potential consequences of the move by the Ethiopian government to violate the constitutionally guaranteed 
freedom of religion would push the country into a catastrophic disaster.  
 
10. Recommendations 
As we know, key entry points for development are peace (internal and external) and security. Therefore, 
maintaining and fostering peace and internal stability are worth considerations in the quest for national integration. 
There must be cordial state society relationships. Actors should act in the right direction that might result in win-
win situations. How can we just return to the past golden days when we saw unique and amazing state society 
relationships? One pathway, could be adopting right based approach, in which policy makers consider the 
protection of human rights while making decisions. The other could be establishing transparent and accountable 
institutions such as the Mejlis, which are not less concerned about the purpose for which they are established. The 
working of the council (Mejlis) should be free, fair and transparent including in its electoral process, the point in 
which the recent controversy emerged. Here, although, the regulation and monitoring process for the purposes of 
concerns with regard to terrorism might not be ignored, excessive intervention through the council is highly 
disastrous. Equally important point here is the issue of peace building in post conflict arenas. This might include, 
stopping the increasing interference, using balanced force in times of conflict, freeing those who are in jail, official 
apology and indemnity for those who lost their families in the conflict, managing state media (the discourse of 
terrorism and some sort of dispute should be carefully presented to the public), amending the country’s law on 
terrorism, allow civil society organizations to take the responsibility to settle conflicts ahead of their escalation 
and others. 
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